In traditional wars, armies concentrated their firepower on clearly defined and visible strategic targets: military bases, weapons factories, airfields and fuel depots. Supply lines could be followed on a map, battle plans could be drawn up with relative certainty, and the effectiveness of battles could be measured in terms of numbers, firepower and tactical manoeuvres. The enemy had a face, a uniform and a recognisable geographical location.

Today, all this is part of the logic of warfare, which is disappearing. Over the last two decades, the digital revolution has created a second layer of strategic infrastructure - invisible, ubiquitous, deeply embedded in world economies - that has quietly changed the way power is exercised and war is waged. Digital infrastructure has moved from the periphery of conflicts to their operational core. Intelligence gathering, drone coordination and decision-making on the battlefield: all increasingly dependent on cloud services and AI platforms. Today's conflict architecture relies as much on networks managed by private companies as on traditional military hardware, writes Lorenzo Maria Pacini.

This changing reality has important geopolitical implications. Against the backdrop of an increasingly tense standoff between Iran, the United States and Israel, Tehran has developed a clear strategic position: the technological backbone supporting Western-linked military operations in West Asia cannot be considered politically neutral. It is an extension of the battlefield itself - an area where economic resources, business platforms and national security objectives intersect. Understanding this change means facing an uncomfortable truth: in 21st century warfare, servers are as important as soldiers.

Business networks as instruments of warfare

In recent years, the world's most advanced militaries have integrated digital platforms into every phase of modern warfare. Satellite surveillance systems send real-time data to cloud computing networks. Armed drones transmit high-definition video footage that requires immediate and continuous analysis. Signal interception capabilities generate massive amounts of intelligence that must be transformed into rapid operational decisions. In this scenario, military power is no longer measured solely by missile stockpiles or airspace control, but by the ability to process information faster than the adversary.

Large technology companies are now at the heart of this process. Companies like Amazon, Microsoft and Google provide the infrastructure that allows governments and militaries to store, analyse and share critical information globally. Their cloud platforms support intelligence analysis, battlefield logistics, and command and control coordination across multiple theatres of operation simultaneously. This is not a secondary or supporting role: it is a structural function that is embedded at the heart of today's military operations.

This convergence of business technology and state power has redefined the way conflicts are understood. Digital networks have become as indispensable as aircraft carriers or missile defence systems. In the context of the US-Israeli war against Iran, Tehran has interpreted this reality as evidence that large technology companies are an integral part of hostile environments - not just neutral economic actors, but operational nodes in a hostile military ecosystem.

This perception was given concrete form and public visibility when the Iranian media published a list of nearly thirty sites in West Asia - and the United Arab Emirates in particular - with links to major global technology companies. Among them were regional headquarters, engineering offices and large data centres operated by Amazon, Microsoft, Google, Oracle, NVIDIA, IBM and Palantir Technologies. According to Tehran's strategic interpretation, these facilities represent strategic hubs integrated into an operational ecosystem that supports the military capabilities of its adversaries. These infrastructures, which extend from Tel Aviv to Gulf cities such as Dubai, Abu Dhabi and Manama, include cloud services used by government agencies, intelligence services and defence contractors. Some of them directly contribute to the development of artificial intelligence for battlefield surveillance and analysis.

Others support regional digital economies, whose stability indirectly supports opponents' military spending and technological innovation. In an era where data flows determine the outcome of battles, the infrastructure that manages these flows can rightly be considered strategic targets.

The Nimbus project and the quiet militarisation of civilian technology

Few initiatives illustrate the merging of civilian technology and military power as clearly as Israel's Project Nimbus - a multi-billion dollar contract with leading cloud providers to deliver advanced IT services to government and security agencies. Through these programmes, AI applications will be used to analyse intelligence flows, optimise logistics planning and support decision-making processes in military command structures.

The project symbolises a broader and largely irreversible trend: private companies are taking over tasks previously the exclusive preserve of state-owned defence companies. Technology companies are no longer limited to supplying equipment or related services. They operate complex operational ecosystems that support military capabilities in real time, blurring the traditional boundary between civilian economic activities and military infrastructure.

Another good example is companies specialising in data analytics. Platforms that can combine data from different sources can identify patterns of behaviour, predict threats and guide tactical actions in the field. In conflict zones, such tools have as much impact on military operations as traditional weapons systems. Their presence in regional technology centres therefore has implications that go far beyond mere commercial interests.

Advanced equipment also plays a crucial role. Powerful processors from companies like NVIDIA are used to train large-scale AI models, analyse satellite imagery, control automated surveillance systems and manage the navigation of autonomous drones. At the same time, Oracle and IBM provide enterprise computing platforms that enable the integration of operational data between security agencies and strategic coordination at the intercontinental level. Together, these technologies form the digital architecture that underpins modern military operations.

From a strategic point of view, Iran's dependence on technology suppliers makes this system a functional extension of its adversary's power. The more the armed forces depend on cloud computing and data analytics, the more vulnerable these systems are to disruption - whether through cyber operations, economic pressure or targeted physical attacks.

The digital economy as a weapon

The potential consequences of the digital war extend far beyond the battlefield. Today, large technology companies are the pillars of the global financial system. Their market value is in the trillions of dollars, and their services underpin every aspect of the modern economy - from banking transactions to international supply chains, from healthcare systems to institutional communications. Any major disruption to their infrastructure in West Asia could cause immediate and severe volatility in global markets.

The large-scale data centres in the Gulf States highlight the extent of this vulnerability. Over the past decade, governments in the region have invested tens of billions of dollars to attract cloud computing projects and create world-class digital hubs. These facilities serve corporate customers, public institutions and security authorities. They also form the basis of financial networks that enable cross-border payments, currency exchange and capital flows worldwide.

If such infrastructure were to be damaged as a regional conflict escalates, the consequences would quickly be felt in stock markets, investment portfolios and national economies. Banking systems that depend on cloud services could face widespread inoperability. Investor confidence would be undermined, leading to capital flight and increased inflationary pressures. In technology-dependent economies, even relatively short disruptions can have a domino effect in several productive sectors.

For Israel, where the technology industry is a major contributor to exports and overall economic growth, the vulnerability of the digital infrastructure has long-term structural consequences. A long-term crisis affecting data networks could accelerate the outflow of skilled talent, undermine the confidence of international investors and erode the foundations of an innovation-based economy. Global financial institutions have warned that scenarios of digital conflict could radically alter investment patterns, especially in regions considered unstable. The intertwining of business technology and military strategy is thus creating a new and unprecedented form of economic warfare in which financial markets become both battlefields and collateral victims.

Escalation without front lines: hybrid warfare in the digital age

Analysts studying possible Iranian countermeasures increasingly point to hybrid strategies that combine cyber operations with targeted physical measures. Rather than engaging directly in a conventional conflict - a choice that would entail prohibitive costs - Tehran could seek to undermine the operational capabilities of its adversaries by disrupting the digital systems on which they are increasingly structurally dependent.

Cyber-attacks could be aimed at crippling cloud computing platforms, disrupting intelligence processing or disrupting communications networks between regional and global data centres. Such operations would not only hamper military coordination, but would also cause great uncertainty in commercial sectors that depend on uninterrupted digital services - putting political and social pressure on governments and alliances.

Physical attacks on critical infrastructure are another possible way to escalate the situation. Facilities hosting strategic cyber assets, especially those related to defence contracts, could be targeted in an attempt to impose significant operational costs without igniting a large-scale conflict. Disruption of land or undersea cables could sever links between regional hubs and international chains of command, depriving enemy forces of the continuous connectivity they increasingly rely on.

Comparisons with recent conflicts shed light on this change. In Ukraine, cyber operations targeting energy grids and communications systems forced rapid and costly changes to military logistics, demonstrating how the digital dimension can have a decisive impact on field operations. In Gaza, ground network disruptions had a tangible impact on the coordination of operational units, but West Asia offers a distinct and in some respects even more vulnerable scenario: there, cloud infrastructure is not only a complementary support, but a key pillar of US and Israeli military capabilities. The region's integration into the global digital market raises the stakes even higher: any escalation affecting the technological networks threatens to create a double crisis - an operational crisis for the armed forces and an economic crisis for international investors.

A multipolar order where the economy becomes a battlefield

The rise of digital warfare is redefining strategic thinking globally, with implications beyond individual regional conflicts. States facing technologically superior adversaries are looking for ways to exploit their opponents' systemic weaknesses rather than competing on the traditional battlefield of firepower - a battle they cannot win. In this context, attacking economic infrastructure becomes a means of sharing risk among globalised networks, hitting the adversary where it is most vulnerable: its dependence on data flows and market stability.

Iran's rhetoric on technology companies reflects this emerging lesson. By defining business platforms as extensions of hostile military power, Tehran is demonstrating its willingness to challenge the assumption that civilian commercial resources are beyond the reach of conflict - an unwritten policy that has held true for decades but now seems increasingly vulnerable. This position is echoed in a wider multipolar context where economic interdependence can be strategically exploited by those who know how.

At the same time, Washington and its allies have increasingly integrated private sector capabilities into defence planning. Public-private partnerships in cybersecurity, intelligence analysis and advanced information technology have become a hallmark of Western military innovation. While this approach increases operational flexibility, it also exposes companies - and the economies on which they depend - to the consequences of geopolitical conflict. It is a structural vulnerability that no amount of traditional defence spending can eliminate.

War is no longer just a matter for states and their armies. As private technology companies become integrated into military operations, they will inevitably become involved in the consequences of policies decided in distant capitals by decision-makers who rarely consider the impact on the private sector. Financial markets, global investors and civilian infrastructure are caught up in the same vortex of confrontation, with economic networks becoming contested arenas in the struggle for technological and geopolitical supremacy.

Missiles, servers and the future of world power

The escalating deadlock between Iran, the United States and Israel illustrates with exceptional clarity a typical and now irreversible feature of 21st century conflicts: war is fought as much in economic systems and digital architectures as on physical battlefields. Technology companies that once symbolised the universal promises of globalisation - connectivity, openness, shared progress - are now taking ambiguous and increasingly risky positions in this new context of war.

For Iran, the integration of large technology companies into hostile military structures is transforming the business infrastructure into strategic levers of prime importance. Disrupting these networks offers a means to impose significant costs, prevent escalation and change the balance of power without direct, large-scale confrontation - a form of asymmetric deterrence adapted to the digital age. But the consequences for the global economy are potentially devastating: the disruption of one major data centre can cause hundreds of millions of dollars in losses in a matter of days, while confidence in the stability of digital markets and the financial systems that depend on them is undermined.

As states increasingly weaponise data, algorithms and cloud computing networks, the lines between war and trade are blurring and becoming increasingly permeable. Missiles and tanks are still important, and will remain so for a long time to come. But the decisive battles of the future may focus on servers, code and the companies that control them.

In this emerging world order, victory depends not only on the results on the battlefield, but on the ability to operate - and, if necessary, undermine - the technological basis of global power.

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